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ABSTRACT
While the cumulative nature of knowledge is recognized as central to economic growth, the
microeconomic foundations of cumulativeness are less understood.  This paper investigates the
impact of a research-enhancing institution on cumulativeness, highlighting two effects.  First, a
selection effect may result in a high correlation between “high-quality” institutions and knowledge
of high intrinsic quality.  Second, an institution may have a marginal impact – an incremental
influence on cumulativeness, conditional on the type and quality of knowledge considered.  This
paper distinguishes these effects in the context of a specific institution, biological resource centers
(BRCs).  BRCs are “living libraries” that authenticate, preserve, and offer independent access to
biological materials, such as cells, cultures, and specimens.  BRCs may enhance the cumulativeness
of knowledge by reducing the marginal cost to researchers of drawing on prior research efforts.  We
exploit three key aspects of the environment in which BRCs operate to evaluate how they affect the
cumulativeness of knowledge: (a) the impact of scientific knowledge is reflected in future scientific
citations, (b) deposit into BRCs often occurs with a substantial lag after initial research is completed
and published, and (c) “lagged” deposits often result from shocks unrelated to the characteristics of
the materials themselves.  Employing a difference-in-differences estimator linking specific materials
deposits to journal articles, we find evidence for both selection effects and the marginal impact of
BRCs on the cumulativeness of knowledge associated with deposited materials.  Moreover, the
marginal impact increases with time and varies with the economic and institutional conditions in
which deposit occurs. 
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“If I have been able to see further, it was only because I stood on the shoulder of giants.” 
            Isaac Newton, 1676 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At least since the development of scientific societies and related research institutions in 
the 17
th century, the centrality of cumulativeness in scientific and technical advance has been 
recognized.
1  However, from the perspective of economic theory, cumulativeness has only been 
incorporated recently, in models of endogenous economic growth [Romer, 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Jones, 1995] and step-by-step technical progress within industries [Scotchmer, 
1991; Gallini and Scotchmer, 2003].  In order to serve as a foundation for long-term growth, 
scientific research and technological progress must exert a positive intertemporal spillover; as 
Jones [1995] emphasizes, to avoid diminishing returns to research investments, research itself 
must “stand on the shoulders” of prior knowledge.  
Though extremely insightful in deriving the implications of cumulativeness for related 
economic variables (such as the equilibrium growth rate or the incentives for innovation), these 
models do not articulate the conditions that result in a cumulative research environment.  For 
example, as Mokyr [2002] elegantly and persuasively argues, the mere production of knowledge 
does not guarantee that others will be able to exploit it.  Effective diffusion of knowledge across 
researchers and over time requires that individuals are aware of extant knowledge and pay the 
costs of accessing that knowledge.  Further, since any individual researcher only captures a small 
share of the benefit from the process of certifying knowledge and making it accessible, there may 
be  a  significant  gap  between  the  private  and  social  returns  associated  with  investments  that 
contribute to the diffusion of scientific knowledge.  Overall, then, the ability of a society to stand 
on the shoulders of giants depends not only on the amount of knowledge it generates, but on the 
                                                 
1   Though certainly not the first example, Newton’s recognition of cumulativeness is (famously) recognized in his 
classic 1676 letter to scientific rival Robert Hooke in the context of a dispute over the nature of light:  “What 
Des-Cartes did was a good step. You have added much several ways, & especially in taking ye colours of thin 
plates  unto  philosophical  consideration.  If  I  have  seen  further  it  is  by  standing  on  ye  sholders  of  Giants.”  
Economic historians and economists of technical change, most notably Nathan Rosenberg (1963), highlighted the 
centrality of cumulativeness in economic growth long before this idea was incorporated into formal models.   As 
well, the role of institutions in promoting the explosion of scientific research in 17
th century England is the 
cornerstone of Merton’s seminal contributions to the sociology of science (Merton, 1957; 1973), which itself has 
served as a foundation for the “new” economics of science (Dasgupta and David, 1994).    2 
quality  of  mechanisms  for  storing  knowledge,  the  fidelity  of  knowledge,  and  the  costs  of 
accessing knowledge.   
Institutions and public policy are often suggested as central to the cumulative process.  
Social scientists face a considerable challenge, however, in assessing the extent to which any 
particular institution influences the way in which the “knowledge stock” is created, maintained, 
and extended.   It is empirically difficult to isolate the impact of a particular piece of knowledge 
from  the  impact  of  the  particular  institution  in  which  it  is  embedded,  although  the  two  are 
conceptually distinct.   Two forces may be at work:  First, a selection effect may result from a 
high  correlation  between  “high-quality”  institutions  and  knowledge  of  high  intrinsic  quality.  
However,  for  policy  analysis,  we  are  often  more  interested  in  the  marginal  impact  of  an 
institution – the incremental influence of an institution on cumulativeness, conditional on the 
nature and quality of knowledge embodied in it.  Without an identification strategy capable of 
isolating selection and marginal effects, research examining the role of institutions on knowledge 
diffusion will confound these two effects. 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide direct statistical evidence of the impact 
of  a  specific  institution  –  biological  resource  centers  (BRCs)  –  on  the  cumulativeness  of 
knowledge, distinguishing the marginal impact of the institution from the effect of selection into 
that institution.  Biological resource centers play a central (but invisible) role in life sciences 
research.  BRCs collect, certify and distribute biological organisms for use in biological research 
and  in  the  development  of  commercial  products  in  the  pharmaceutical,  agricultural  and 
biotechnology industries.  BRCs maintain large and varied collections of biological materials, 
including  cell  lines,  microorganisms,  and  DNA  material,  and  distribute  tools  that  allow 
researchers to access and exploit these materials.  The ability to exploit prior research in the life 
sciences depends on access to the cells, cultures, and specimens used in that research.  BRCs are 
a  key  institutional  arrangements  through  which  scientists  can  obtain  materials  for  research 
purposes.  A key objective of our empirical analysis is to evaluate whether the ability to access 
research  materials  through  a  BRC  is  associated  with  enhancing  the  impact  of  the  scientific 
research article that initially described those research materials. 
At  a  broad  level,  our  analysis  contributes  to  understanding  the  microfoundations  of 
knowledge accumulation, which plays an important role in leading to ideas-driven growth.  More 
specifically, our empirical approach extends recent studies using citation analysis to investigate   3 
the impact of institutions and technological communities on the cumulativeness of discovery and 
innovation [Jaffe, et al, 1993; Griliches, 1998].  We exploit three aspects of our empirical setting 
to  develop  and  implement  a  differences-in-differences  estimate  of  the  impact  of  BRCs  on 
knowledge spillovers.  First, in most cases, each material deposited in a BRC is associated with a 
journal article that describes its initial characterization and application.  Second, for specific 
types of BRC deposits, there is a significant lag between that initial article and its deposit into a 
BRC, and, in certain cases, the transfer of the materials was motivated by factors unrelated to the 
extent  of  their  use.    Specifically,  we  examine  the  deposit  of  materials  into  BRCs  that  are 
associated with “special collections” that are transferred in toto from smaller collections from 
which they had previously circulated into a major BRC, as a result of either  the departure of a 
principal  investigator  or  in  response  to  institution-wide  funding  difficulties  unrelated  to  the 
culture collection itself.  Third, we take advantage of the fact that each of the special collections 
we analyze was a unified collection prior to deposit and was transferred as a group.  Thus, the 
institutional  shock  is  consistent  for  every  material  within  a  collection,  and  any  systematic 
differences  in  the  impact  of  that  shock  on  future  knowledge  diffusion  can  be  linked  to  the 
characteristics of the materials themselves. 
In our empirical analysis, we focus on these “special collections” and evaluate whether 
articles associated with BRC deposited materials receive a boost in citations after deposit has 
occurred (after accounting for an article-specific fixed effect, and controlling for age and year 
fixed effects).  In so doing, we are able to separately identify the role of selection (the likelihood 
that materials deposited into BRCs are associated with intrinsically important research) from the 
marginal  impact  of  BRCs  (the  impact  of  BRCs  in  enhancing  diffusion,  controlling  for  the 
intrinsic importance of that knowledge).  Our approach builds on the considerable advances that 
have been made in recent years in evaluating differences-in-differences estimation [Bertrand, 
Duflo, Mullainathan, 2004].  Beyond our main specifications, we are able to provide a series of 
checks of our identification assumptions that reinforce our overall approach.   
Our results provide strong empirical support for both the selection effect and the marginal 
impact of BRCs.  Even in the period before their materials are accessible through a BRC, those 
research articles that are ultimately linked to BRCs experience nearly double the citation rate 
compared to a set of control articles drawn from the same journal and published in the same year.  
Even if the marginal impact of BRCs were to be zero, this result is important, as it suggest that   4 
the  particular  institution  we  study  identifies  and  preserves  materials  that  are,  themselves,  of 
greater than average importance in the life sciences.  In fact, if the selection effect were not 
positive and significant, we may worry that a potential ‘advertising’ effect of BRCs may lead 
less important materials to be circulated.  Conditional on materials becoming accessible through 
a BRC, their associated articles then experience a significant citation boost.  The size of this 
boost ranges from just over 50% to more than 125% across the key specifications.  In addition, 
this citation boost persists and, indeed, grows over time.  This finding is consistent with the role 
of BRCs in helping to preserve the accessibility of knowledge for future research generations.  
While most articles are swiftly forgotten, the “rate of forgetting” associated with BRC-affiliated 
articles is substantially after accession.  Taken together, these results suggest that BRCs play an 
economically significant role in the intertermporal diffusion of knowledge in the life sciences. 
To understand the mechanisms that drive this result, we further investigate whether the 
impact of BRC deposit depends on the economic or institutional conditions under which deposit 
occurs.  We  provide  suggestive  evidence  that  the  benefits  to  BRC  deposit  arise  both  from  a 
reduction in the “transactional” costs of accessing materials and an increase in the degree of 
certification associated with deposited materials.  Specifically, we take advantage of the fact that 
different deposits in the same collection experience a similar “shock” in transaction costs, except 
for the differences in the prices charged by the BRC for different materials, and differences in 
the ex ante degree of perceived quality of those materials.  Our results suggest that the impact of 
BRC deposit on future citations is lower for materials that are made available at higher prices, 
and the citation boost is higher for articles associated with non-US authors (where the returns to 
certification may be higher). 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II discusses the role of research-
enhancing  institutions  in  knowledge  diffusion.    Section  III  describes  BRCs,  focusing  on  the 
mechanisms by which these institutions lower the cost and increase the “tightness” of knowledge 
over time.  Section IV outlines a differences-in-differences framework for identifying the impact 
of BRCs on knowledge diffusion. Sections V and VI review the data and present the empirical 
results, respectively.  A final section concludes. 
   5 
II.  THE  IMPACT  OF  RESEARCH-ENHANCING  INSTITUTIONS  ON  THE 
DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE 
The dynamic accumulation of knowledge has become a central issue to many different 
areas  of  economic  research.    Institutions  and  public  policy  are  often  suggested  as  key 
determinants  of  the  ability  of  an  economy  to  sustain  cumulative  knowledge  production 
[Rosenberg, 1963, 1979; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; David, 2001; Mokyr, 2002].  The diffusion 
of  knowledge  over  time  depends  on  institutions  that  facilitate  low-cost  knowledge  transfer 
among researchers and over research generations.  Institutions may lower the costs of access to 
useful knowledge by enhancing “the technology of access, the trustworthiness of the sources, 
and the total size of the [stock of knowledge about the natural phenomena and regularities]” 
[Mokyr, 2002, p. 8].
2  We refer to economic institutions that promote the cumulativeness of the 
research process (through one or more of these mechanisms) as research-enhancing institutions. 
Over the past two decades, a great deal of qualitative and quantitative economic research 
has  investigated  specific  research-enhancing  institutions,  often  with  the  objective  of 
documenting the presence of knowledge spillovers.
3  While the attempt to identify and measure 
knowledge  production  and  diffusion  is  inherently  difficult  [Griliches,  1990],  a  sophisticated 
empirical  literature  has  emerged  recently  that  attempts  to  identify  the  impact  of  particular 
institutions  on  the  extent  of  knowledge  spillovers.    This  research  often  employs  citations  to 
academic  papers  or  granted  patents  to  estimate  the  influence  of  prior  knowledge  on  current 
advances.
4  Perhaps no research-enhancing institution has been more intensively studied than the 
                                                 
2   Put another way, “Progress in exploiting the existing stock of knowledge depends first and foremost on the 
efficiency  and  cost  of  access  to  knowledge”  (Mokyr,  2002,  p.  7).      While  we  focus  on  the  role  of  formal 
knowledge-sharing  institutions,  substantial  (and  ever-increasing)  human  capital  investments  in  specialized 
scientific and engineering knowledge are perhaps the single most important barrier to discovery at the frontier (B. 
Jones, 2003).  
3   While systematic empirical evidence is more recent, the linkage between institutions and cumulativeness has 
been emphasized at least since Vannevar Bush’s 1945 policy manifesto, Science: The Endless Frontier.  Nelson 
(1959) and Arrow (1963) built on Bush’s compelling articulation of the role of basic research in economy-wide 
prosperity to identify the public goods nature of basic research and the case for public investment.  More recently, 
the national innovation systems literature (as pioneered by, among others, Nelson, 1993) emphasizes the role of 
research-enhancing institutions in mediating geographically-localized knowledge spillovers.  
4   While citations are certainly not the only means by which we can measure the cumulative impact of a given piece 
of scientific research, citations are a useful though noisy indicator of the exploitation of knowledge by subsequent 
researchers  (and  are  likely  more  informative  in  the  life  sciences  than  in    social  science  disciplines  such  as 
economics or sociology).  Most research papers in the life sciences are short and focused, with few extraneous 
references to literatures beyond those directly impacting the specific results described.  As a result, the principal 
rationale  for  the  inclusion  of  a  citation  for  a  paper  associated  with  a  BRC  deposit  is  when  the  material  is 
explicitly used in a follow-on experiment, or the experiment is closely connected to the research findings and 
knowledge linked to that specific material.   6 
university.  For example, Jaffe et al [1993; 1998] examine whether university patents receive 
citations at a significantly higher rate and with significantly greater geographical scope than a 
group  of  “control”  patents  drawn  from  similar  geographic  and  technological  areas.    More 
recently, Branstetter [2003] reviews patterns of patent citations to academic research papers, and 
finds that spillovers from academic science to commercialized inventions occurs in a limited set 
of technological fields and geographic areas.  As well, prior studies have investigated the role of 
specific  policies,  such  as  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  or  the  strengthening  of  patent  rights  in  Japan 
[Mowery et al., 2001; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001].  The 
“search  for  spillovers”  has  extended  its  reach  beyond  university  and  IP  law,  now  including 
studies of R&D consortia [Irwin and Klenouw, 1996; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002], the 
national laboratories [Jaffe and Lerner, 2001), venture capital (Kortum and Lerner, 2000], and 
patent pools [Lerner and Tirole, 2003], among others.
5 
While this prior literature has established a close empirical association between research-
enhancing  institutions  and  the  impact  of  scientific  and  technical  knowledge  (as  reflected  in 
higher rates of citations to papers and patents, respectively), prior research has not been able to 
disentangle  whether  these  institutions  facilitate  cumulativeness  per  se,  or  whether  they  are 
simply linked to knowledge which has  a higher intrinsic impact.   In the terminology of the 
program  evaluation  literature,  prior  research  conflates  the  selection  effect  (high  quality 
institutions are simply associated with high quality knowledge) with the marginal impact of 
those institutions on knowledge diffusion.  For example, university patents may be more highly 
cited (relative to a control group of patents generated by industrial-based laboratories) because 
the research reflected in the patent is more fundamental or because the norms of disclosure and 
openness associated with a university contribute to more effective diffusion of that knowledge.  
In other words, the long-term impact of knowledge depends not only on its importance but on its 
linkage to institutions that facilitate low-cost knowledge diffusion.  The remainder of this paper 
is devoted to disentangling these two effects in the context of a specific research-enhancing 
institution, biological resource centers. 
 
                                                 
5   It is useful to note that a sociological literature has also developed, focusing on whether the ability of a researcher 
to draw upon others’ knowledge is linked to their participation and position within specific social networks in 
which that knowledge is embedded (Powell, 1998; Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998) and on the norms of use 
associated with that knowledge (Sorenson and Fleming, 2004).   7 
III.  BIOLOGICAL  RESOURCE  CENTERS  AND  CUMULATIVE  RESEARCH  IN 
THE LIFE SCIENCES
6 
III.A.  The Problem of Authenticated Biomaterials & the Advance of Life Sciences  
Compared  with  many  other  scientific  and  technological  areas,  research  in  the  life 
sciences has developed dramatically in the last several decades.  While scientific opportunity has 
likely played an important role in these advances, the life sciences have also benefited from their 
ability to address a number of the constraints that may otherwise limit step-by-step progress.  
One of the central constraints on the capacity of life science research to advance knowledge is its 
ability to maintain the integrity of shared biomaterials.  Because lines of inquiry in life sciences 
require building on the advances of others, researchers often must rely on research materials 
initially  generated  in  other  laboratories.    Equally,  follow-on  research  even  within  the  same 
laboratory  or  set  of  labs  requires  exact  replication  of  research  materials  used  in  prior 
experiments.    Without  an  effective  system  to  ensure  that  the  materials  used  in  particular 
experiments  are  exactly  the  materials  that  researchers  believe  they  are  using,  advances  in 
microbiological research would be limited.  
Though seemingly simple, this straightforward problem has bedeviled the life sciences 
research  community  since  the  advent  of  transportable  biomaterials  in  the  1950s.    Before 
researchers grasped the importance of biomaterials fidelity (and before verification techniques 
were  developed  and  widely  understood),  it  was  the  norm  for  researchers  to  exchange 
biomaterials through peer-based networks.  As a consequence, a surprisingly large share of the 
materials  exchanged  between  labs  became  contaminated  with  other  cell  lines  or  otherwise 
misidentified.  For example, a scientist using materials initially obtained from another laboratory 
might believe that an experiment was being conducted on cells from the healthy embryonic lung 
cells of a white male but was, in fact, unwittingly using cancerous cervix cells from a 31-year old 
African-American woman.  Indeed, exactly this problem cast doubt over thousands of individual 
research findings, including the research of Nobel Prize-winning scientists and other researchers 
around the world:  In a series of revelations in the 1970s that became known as the “HeLa 
scandals,”  researcher  Walter  Nelson-Rees  and  his  collaborators  documented  that  dozens  of 
widely-used cell lines were not pure, as researchers thought, but were instead contaminated by 
                                                 
6   Stern (2004) provides a more thorough description of the functions and history of BRCs.  See, also, Cypess 
(2003) and OECD (2001) for an introduction to BRC functions and policy issues.   8 
the cervical cancer cells of a Baltimore woman named after Henrietta Lacks who died in 1951 
[Gold, 1986].  Although the most well-known cases of misidentification were uncovered during 
the  1970s,  some  researchers  believe  that  contamination  and  misidentification  of  biological 
materials remains a central problem. According to recent estimates, more than 20% of cell lines 
may be misidentified [MacLeod, et al, 1999], and thousands of published articles each year use 
cell lines that may be misidentified [Masters, 2002]. 
In  addition  to  concerns  about  the  prospect  that  mischaracterized  materials  may  yield 
errors in research, uncertainty about the fidelity of biomaterials alone can result in considerable 
research delays.  In the absence of a means for ensuring that the materials with which they are 
working are as expected (and are pure), scientists must undertake substantial efforts to verify 
each  of  the  materials  they  employ.    Thus,  the  rate  of  advance  in  the  life  sciences  depends 
critically on researchers’ confidence in the authenticity and purity of their materials. 
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  the  problem  of  maintaining  the  fidelity  of  research 
materials is not principally a technological or scientific problem but is driven by the economics 
of  research  incentives.    Whereas  individual  scientists  have  few  incentives  to  engage  in 
replication and validation activities, researchers who have published specific findings may find it 
worthwhile to limit scrutiny of their results.  Though a robust system for validating experimental 
research  is  in  the  interest  of  all  scientists,  individual  researchers  have  few  incentives  to 
contribute to this outcome.  Because the integrity of the scientific process is a public good, an 
institutional response is crucial for addressing this problem. 
 
III.B.  Institutional Arrangements for Sharing Biomaterials 
Several  alternative  institutional  arrangements  exist  for  collecting,  certifying,  and 
circulating biological materials, including peer-to-peer networks, for-profit culture collections, 
private culture collections, and biological resource centers. 
Peer-to-peer  networks  consist  of  informal  exchanges  among  researchers  and  are 
dependent  on  research  laboratories  maintaining  culture  collections  and  fulfilling  requests  by 
other  researchers  for  distribution.    In  some  cases,  researchers  may  maintain  small  personal 
collections of materials used in current work; in other cases, researchers maintain modest-sized 
collections of materials that they store and exchange regularly with colleagues within and across 
their institution.  In a “pure” peer-to-peer network, it is impossible to require researchers to   9 
exchange materials and initial discoverers may be reluctant to offer access to researchers whose 
experiments  could  undermine  the  value  of  the  initial  work.    At  the  very  least,  peer-to-peer 
transactions require that researchers who want to use particular research materials contact, and, 
occasionally, negotiate with the initial developer of the material.  In some cases, negotiations 
over  access to materials, such  as lab data, or cell lines may  be conditional on the recipient 
extending an offer of co-authorship or some other incentive.   In other cases, the transfer of 
materials may be dependent upon the recipient agreeing to the terms of a Materials Transfer 
Agreement.  The problem of verification may also be substantial in peer-to-peer networks, as the 
scientists making and agreeing to exchanges often rely on layers of assistants to prepare, send, 
receive, and employ research materials.
7 
Some  laboratories  maintain  culture  collections  than  are  larger  than  those  usually 
maintained for personal use by individual researchers.  These collections circulate materials on a 
fairly regular basis, generally without formal restrictions such as those imposed by Materials 
Transfer Agreements.  Although they circulate their materials fairly regularly, these collections 
have limited resources to dedicate to preservation and certification functions.  Although they face 
fewer restrictions on materials circulation, these larger academic collections are subject to some 
of the same difficulties in verification as are individual collections in the peer-to-peer network. 
For-profit  biomaterials  distribution  firms  and  private  collections,  such  as  those 
maintained by major pharmaceutical companies, constitute alternative institutions for circulating 
biomaterials.  Not surprisingly, for-profit firms tend to “cherry-pick,” focusing on a narrow range 
of materials that offer high margins and low storage costs.  Reputation-based mechanisms and 
the relationship between quality and sales may lead their materials to be relatively trustworthy.  
Proprietary  collections,  such  as  those  maintained  by  companies  such  Merck  and  Lilly,  are 
designed  to  benefit  individual  firms.    However,  since  circulating  catalogs  of  their  materials 
would communicate competitive intelligence to rivals, these organizations rarely circulate their 
materials externally and require extensive Materials Transfer Agreements when they do. 
                                                 
7   It  is  possible  that  informal  “brokers”  will  emerge  in  a  peer-to-peer  network,  facilitating  transactions  in  the 
“market for ideas” (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999; Gans and Stern, 2002).  However, brokers are limited by 
their incentives and the extent of their personal networks. As well, the connections enabled by a broker are 
subject to termination if the broker discontinues her role (because of retirement or changing interests).  The fact 
that it is difficult to identify precisely  who is responsible  when  shared  materials become contaminated also 
complicates  the  prospect  that  reputation-based  mechanisms  will  ensure  that  researchers  share  their  “best” 
materials even when asked. 
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III.C.  What are Biological Resource Centers? 
Biological Resource Centers constitute an additional alternative to peer-to-peer networks 
private  collections,  and  for-profit  biomaterials  distribution  firms.    BRCs  are  institutions  that 
collect, certify, and distribute biological organisms for use in life science research and in the 
development  of  commercial  products  in  the  pharmaceutical,  agricultural  and  biotechnology 
industries  –  in  a  sense,  they  serve  as  “living  libraries”  preserving  and  circulating  research 
materials.  As a key element of the life sciences research infrastructure, BRCs maintain a large 
and varied collection of biological materials, including cell lines, micro-organisms, recombinant 
DNA material, biological media and reagents, and the information technology tools that allow 
researchers to access biological materials.  Over the past quarter century, they have come to play 
an increasingly important role in scientific and commercial research.  The definition and scope of 
BRCs have evolved over time.  Initially referred to as culture collections or cell banks, experts 
described  their  functions  as  “acquiring,  preserving,  authenticating,  and  distributing 
microorganisms or in vitro cultured cells to qualified scientists” [Stevenson and Hatt, 1992].  
BRCs are therefore related to but distinct from mammalian research supply institutions, such as 
Bar Harbor’s Jackson Laboratory, which provides JAX knock-out mice to researchers throughout 
the world [Murray, 2005].  Over the past few decades, the scope of traditional culture collections 
have expanded, leading most centers to reclassify themselves as biological resource centers. 
8  
Since the 1980s, select BRCs have been critical to the extension of intellectual property 
rights, by serving as international patent depositories for all patented living organisms.  Indeed, 
according to the terms of the Budapest Treaty for the Deposit of Cultures that are the Subject of 
Patent  Procedures,  which  was  introduced  in  1977  and  implemented  beginning  in  1981,  all 
patented biological materials must be deposited in a certified BRC in order for that material to 
receive patent protection.
9 
                                                 
8  In a recent report, the OECD describes BRCs’ as, “service providers and repositories of living cells, genomes of 
organisms, and information relating to heredity and the function of biological systems.  BRCs contain collections 
of culturable organisms (e.g. micro-organisms, plant, animal and human cells), replicable parts of these (e.g. 
genomes,  plasmids,  viruses,  cDNAs),  viable  but  not  yet  culturable  organisms,  cells  and  tissues,  as  well  as 
databases containing molecular, physiological and structural information relevant to these collections and related 
bioinformatics” (OECD, 2001).  
9   See Stern (2004, p. 52-53) for an overview of the Budapest Treaty.  
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BRCs can differ in their functioning and governance.  As of 2002, the World Federation 
of Culture Collections lists more than 450 distinct BRCs around the world.  Collections vary 
dramatically in the size of their holdings, ranging from less than 100 to more than 100,000 
cultures.  Overall, more than one million cultures are maintained by BRCs throughout the world, 
and millions of cultures are distributed each year by BRCs to scientists throughout the world.  
Large  national  collections,  such  as  the  ATCC  in  the  United  States  or  DSMZ  in  Germany, 
manage a broad range of materials, while specialized collections, such as Yale University’s E. 
Coli collection, provide a niche resources for particular scientific areas.   Although all collect, 
identify and distribute materials, BRCs vary in how exhaustively they authenticate and certify 
the materials that constitute their collections.  For example, while leading BRCs in the United 
States  such  as  ATCC  and  the  Coriell  Institute  are  both  recognized  for  their  international 
leadership  in  cell  culture  technique,  newer  and  smaller  collections  have  tended  to  adopt 
techniques and protocols developed elsewhere.   Finally, while the plurality of BRCs around the 
world rely principally on government financing, some large national collections, especially those 
in the United States, rely on a mixture of public and private support.  For example, the ATCC is 
organized  as  a  private  not-for-profit  institution,  which  derives  the  majority  its  income  from 
activities  such  as  its  patent  depository  distribution  services,  although  it  also  receives 
governmental support.  (Appendix Table I lists examples of various types of Biological Resource 
Centers.) 
Despite  some  differences  in  form,  BRCs  share  a  common  purpose:  they  serve  as 
repositories that make materials and research results developed by one generation of researchers 
available for future research endeavors.  In so doing, prototypical BRCs exhibit characteristics of 
the  type  of  institutions  that  Mokyr  [2002]  describes  as  potential  contributors  to  cumulative 
knowledge  growth.    In  contrast  to  alternative  institutional  arrangements,  archetypal  BRCs 
engage in the preservation and certification of biomaterials, offer independent access to those 
materials, and take advantage of economics of scale and scope in the process.  While some 
alternative institutional arrangements support some of these activities – for-profit collections also 
invest substantially in in-house certification, for example – only BRCs are dedicated to the full 
range of these activities.  As a result, well-functioning BRCs may be able to lower the cost of 
follow-on research substantially in comparison to alternative institutional arrangements.  
   12 
III.D.  Features of Biological Resource Centers 
III.D.1 Preservation of Biological Materials 
The preservation of biological materials is a primary function of BRCs.  BRCs collect, 
characterize, and maintain an exceptionally broad collection of biological materials, including 
materials whose value is not initially understood.   For example, the largest collection in the 
United States, maintained at the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), includes more than 
92,000 strains of micro-organisms and cell isolates, and more than 5,000,000 DNA sequences.  
In Europe, the large German collection, the DSMZ, maintains more than 16,000 cell cultures, 
representing more than 5,000 distinct microorganism species.  BRCs retain these collections over 
extremely long periods of time, even when specific applications are not immediately apparent.   
The  potential  windfall  associated  with  long-term  preservation  can  be  seen  through 
illustration.    Consider  the  case  of  Thermus  aquaticus.    In  the  late  1960s,  Thomas  Brock 
discovered a new type of micro-organism – an extremophile – which lived in the rather severe 
climate  of  the  hot  springs  of  Yellowstone  National  Park.    Though  no  practical  benefit  was 
foreseen at the time, extremophiles exhibited a number of distinctive properties, including the 
ability to sustain enzymatic reactions during rapid heating and cooling (a property which was 
critical for sustaining life in a geyser).  At the time of its discovery, the ATCC then established 
and maintained an extremophile collection for use by both academic and industrial researchers. 
More  than  15  years  later,  Kary  Mullis,  a  researcher  at  Cetus  Corporation,  experienced  a 
fundamental insight when he conceived of polymerase chain reaction (known as PCR), the basic 
technique that allows for rapid replication of DNA (at the time, this was arguably the single 
largest bottleneck in biotechnology research).   Mullis’ insight required a material that could 
withstand  extreme  temperature  variation  during  the  replication  process.    While  the  effort  to 
develop such a material synthetically might have taken years, Cetus researchers were able to 
identify and draw upon the extremophile collection at the ATCC to rapidly implement a practical 
approach to PCR, revolutionizing the modern life sciences.  Not only  did PCR dramatically 
improve research productivity in the life sciences (e.g., resulting in the core techniques behind 
the Human Genome Project), but Mullis shared the Nobel Prize in 1993, and Thermus aquaticus 
itself was named “Molecule of the Year” by Science in 1989. 
BRCs  offer  particular  advantages  in  preservation  relative  to  alternative  institutional 
arrangements.  For example, because the IP rights held by for-profit laboratories exists for only a   13 
modest time (often less than the time between initial characterization and greatest potential use), 
the  for-profit  community  has  few  incentives  to  maintain  the  widest  range  of  materials 
indefinitely.  Indeed, for-profit distributors of biological materials tend to “cherry-pick” a narrow 
range of materials offering high margins and low storage costs.  As well, private life science 
firms, such as pharmaceutical companies, often maintain their own in-house facilities.  These 
facilities are likely to preserve a narrow range of materials relevant to their own research efforts, 
and only for periods corresponding to their expected in-house use.  Compared to traditional 
laboratories  that  maintain  most  materials  for  less  than  a  decade,  BRCs  have  established 
procedures and technologies to allow materials to be preserved for many decades (and even 
perhaps for centuries).  While private not-for-profit collections exist in large numbers within the 
peer-to-peer  scientific  network  (most  of  which  are  highly  duplicative  of  each  other),  most 
collections are narrow, and depend on the idiosyncratic interest (and unpaid effort) of individual 
researchers, raising the possibility that materials will be lost due to retirement or inattention by 
culture curators.
10  Whereas BRCs explicitly focus on preservation, there are few incentives 
within for-profit entities or the peer-to-peer network to maintain a full range of materials for an 
indefinite  period  of  time.    By  serving  to  facilitate  large  scale  retention  and  maintenance  of 
biological  materials,  BRCs  both  aid  knowledge  diffusion  in  the  short  term  and  limit  costly 
duplication effort over time.   
 
III.D.2 Certification in Biological Resource Centers 
BRCs  also  certify  research  materials.    While  BRCs  do  not  fully  replicate  published 
experiments, materials incorporated into BRC collections undergo a series of reviews and tests to 
establish their identity and biological viability.  BRCs therefore provide the means for scientific 
replication.  Some BRCs, such as the ATCC, offer a classification system that allows researchers 
to evaluate the degree of confidence associated with specific deposits.  The ATCC and DSMZ, 
for example, regularly issue notices identifying materials errors and misclassifications.   
As  illustrated  in  the  case  of  massive  HeLa  contaminations,  the  consequences  of 
                                                 
10  For example, in January, 2002, three private university collections were identified as “orphans” available for new 
storage site; two of these three were classified as “defunct” by July, 2002 (methanogens.pdx.edu/usfcc).   14 
misidentification  are  far-reaching.
11    Not  only  does  misidentification  cast  a  cloud  over  the 
findings  of  current  researchers  (with  career  implications  for  those  whose  results  are  under 
suspicion), but confusion and uncertainty places a longer-term cost on progress.  In addition to 
minimizing the likelihood of contamination and spurious findings, effective certification enables 
researchers to avoid needless and costly duplication, and thus increase research productivity over 
time.  In the absence of effective certification procedures, researchers must painstakingly re-
establish the validity of specific findings in order to design and implement new research:  they 
must  literally  re-invent  the  wheel.    As  highlighted  by  Mokyr  [2002],  the  “tightness”  of 
knowledge is crucial for the effective use of knowledge; certification by an “invisible” institution 
such as BRC enhances the tightness of knowledge and so allows researchers to increase their 
productivity by avoiding costly verification procedures. 
Relative  to  peer-to-peer  materials  distribution  systems,  BRCs  possess  significant 
advantages in certifying biomaterials.  First, the repeated nature of BRC-scientist transactions 
enhances the incentives that BRCs face to ensure the fidelity of all materials.  As well, larger 
institutions are more capable of bearing the fixed costs associated with materials certification, 
which include the costs of substantial laboratory equipment, information technology, and skills 
development. 
 
III.D.3 Independent and Open Access to Biological Materials  
Third, BRCs advertise the availability of materials in their collections and ensure that 
these are equally accessible to all members of the scientific and technological community, thus 
encouraging independent and open access to the results of prior scientific research.  In non-BRC 
networks, access to source materials is dependent on the “goodwill” of researchers who maintain 
active  cell  cultures  within  their  laboratory;  such  goodwill  is  difficult  to  maintain  when 
                                                 
11  Unfortunately,  the  HeLa  case  is  not  simply  an  isolated,  historical  mistake.    Misidentification  of  biological 
materials plagues published (and patented) research findings to this day (Masters et al, 2001).  The story of the 
KB cell line is a recent example.  Originally derived from oral cancer cells, KB became contaminated with HeLa 
cells.    In  other  words,  it  is  well  documented  that  researchers  using  the  KB  line  are  actually  performing 
experiments with the HeLa line.  Despite this, more than 300 published articles based on the KB line were 
published  between  1998  and  2000,  many  of  which  claimed  to  provide  new  findings  specific  to  oral  cancer 
(Masters,  2002).    Moreover,  many  of  these  articles  have  themselves  been  extensively  cited  by  subsequent 
researchers.  The persistence of  misidentification is a consequence of the incentive system in  scientific and 
commercial research:  high-powered incentives to claim priority over a novel discovery, and few if any incentives 
for individuals to validate research claims made by others.  
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researchers are simultaneously competing with each other to establish new research findings or 
when follow-on research may cast prior findings in an unfavorable light.  Alternatively, for-
profit  characterization  and  distribution  companies  will  often  find  it  in  their  private  interest 
(though not in the social interest) to arrange for exclusive access to their databases and materials; 
recent  controversies,  such  as  that  over  the  ownership  and  use  of  the  Harvard  Oncomouse, 
licensed to DuPont, reflects an ongoing and recently pitched battle over access to biological 
materials and data [Murray, 2005]. 
Building  on  earlier  research  in  the  peer-to-peer  system  may  involve  protracted 
negotiations with the initial scientists (e.g., about coauthorships or intellectual property claims).  
Independent access to research materials is required for replication and so is at the heart of the 
scientific  method  in  biological  and  medical  research.    However,  the  incentive  for  individual 
scientists  to  grant  access  is  limited  within  the  modern  university  and  private  life  sciences 
research environment.  Even after results are published (and perhaps because they are published), 
researchers may hold up efforts by others to gain access to materials, both in order to further 
their research lead and to avoid detailed investigation of their research conclusions.   
Consider the costly controversy over the discovery of the AIDS retrovirus.  The race to 
discover  the  cause  of  AIDS  involved  an  intense  and  competitive  battle  between  French 
researchers at the Institut Pasteur and Dr. Robert Gallo’s lab at the National Cancer Institute.  
Though  the  French  team  first  isolated  the  correct  virus,  laboratory-to-laboratory  material 
exchanges resulted in nearly a decade of confusion about the precise nature of the virus and the 
allocation of credit for its initial discovery.  These incidents damaged Gallo’s reputation and 
delayed critical AIDS discoveries.  At least in part, delays in discovery resulted from insufficient 
incentives  for  individual  laboratories  to  provide  low-cost,  independent  access  to  their  own 
research materials. 
In contrast, BRCs sever the direct tie between the researcher associated with an initial 
discovery and those want to build upon the research.  Materials available in BRC collections are 
listed either on public websites or in catalogs.  Relative to a private collection or the peer-to-peer 
network, BRCs lower the costs of accessing research materials.  The importance of this is non-
trivial:  a great deal of knowledge consists of “knowing that something is known and knowing 
how to find it” [Mokyr, 2002, p. 9].   16 
 
III.D.4 Scale and Scope Economies 
Finally, as “living libraries” that continuously collect material developed by the scientific 
community, BRCs are able to achieve substantial scale and scope economies.  Relative to other 
organizational forms that preserve life science materials, BRCs maintain larger, more varied, and 
more balanced collections.  As a result, BRCs are more likely to undertake the investments that 
are necessary to increase the quality and reduce the cost of accessing biological materials.  For 
example, institutions such as the ATCC, the Coriell Institute, and the Jackson Laboratory have 
each established a position of global leadership in specific materials and collection areas.  This 
scale has coincided with a substantial commitment to high quality levels for each activity under 
its domain.  These scale and scope economies are reflected in the use of non-profit BRCs by 
private collections (e.g., by private pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies) and in the 
successful implementation of BRCs as official international patent depositories.  In contrast, in 
the more dispersed peer-to-peer network, duplication abounds across laboratories and there are 
few  incentives  to  maintain  the  high  quality  levels  or  the  broadest  portfolio.    By  achieving 
economies of scale and scope, BRCs can lower the transaction cost of access to the existing 
stock of knowledge. 
 
IV.  THE  IMPACT  OF  INSTITUTIONS  ON  KNOWLEDGE  DIFFUSION:    AN 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
By ensuring the fidelity of and lowering the costs of access to knowledge, institutions 
such as BRCs may influence the equilibrium rate and impact of a given discovery on subsequent 
research.    Three  central  predictions  stand  out.    First,  conditional  on  its  intrinsic  scientific 
importance and quality, a discovery linked to a research-enhancing institution will have a higher 
diffusion  rate,  relative  to  the  case  where  such  knowledge  was  produced  and  diffused 
independently of such an institution.  Second, the marginal impact of association with a research-
enhancing institution will increase over time.  Research-enhancing institutions preserve access to 
discoveries and knowledge for a much longer period of time than is feasible under alternative 
institutional arrangements.  Third, the selection effect suggests that knowledge associated with 
BRC materials may tend to have a higher (or lower) intrinsic scientific value than knowledge 
associated with materials diffused through the peer-to-peer network.     17 
The  presence  of  a  selection  effect  results  in  a  fundamental  inference  problem.  
Specifically, for a given piece of knowledge produced or diffused within a given institutional 
environment, one cannot directly observe the counterfactual impact that knowledge would have 
had if the knowledge had been produced and diffused in an alternative institutional setting.  For 
example, if researchers and BRCs endogenously acquire biological materials tending to have 
high fundamental scientific interest, a simple comparison of the impact of knowledge linked to a 
BRC versus knowledge with no BRC linkage will be biased.  From an experimental perspective, 
the econometrician would ideally observe a given piece of knowledge in distinct institutional 
environments and compare the impact of that knowledge across regimes. 
While  one  cannot  replicate  this  ideal  experimental  design,  this  paper  develops  and 
implements an econometric strategy that takes advantages of the institutional environment to 
estimate the role of selection and marginal effects in the diffusion of scientific knowledge.  Our 
approach exploits two key elements of the system by which scientific research is diffused.  First, 
individual materials made available through BRCs are linked to specific scientific publications.  
We can therefore assess the impact of BRCs by examining the pattern of citations to articles 
associated with BRC deposits.  Though imperfect, citations by future scientific research articles 
provide a useful (though noisy) index of the “impact” of a discovery on subsequent research.   
Second,  many  BRC  material  deposits  occur  long  after  the  publication  date  of  the 
associated scientific research article; moreover, in a number of instances discussed in the next 
section, the act of deposit and its precise timing are arguably econometrically exogenous (and we 
can  apply  differences-in-differences  techniques  to  test  whether,  indeed,  these  deposits  are 
exogenous).   We therefore exploit the timing of transfer  for some collections that had been 
maintained in academic laboratories that get shifted into a public BRC (e.g., when the principal 
investigator retires or switches university affiliation).  In other words, while initial publication 
often  occurs  within  six  months  (or  fewer)  after  initial  journal  submission,  there  are  often 
substantial delays between initial publication and BRC deposit.  For scientific research articles 
linked to BRC deposits that occur with a lag, we thus observe both a pre-deposit and post-deposit 
period.  This allows us to estimate the impact of deposit on knowledge diffusion, measured as the 
change in the rate of citation to the initial article by follow-on scientific research articles.     18 
By linking BRC deposits to potentially citable scientific research articles, we implement 
a differences-in-differences estimator of the marginal impact of BRC deposit.
12  Specifically, we 
construct a dataset composed of scientific publications linked to (delayed) BRC deposits and two 
separate groups of control articles, each of which is comparable to our treatment articles in terms 
of ex ante expectations of scientific impact.  (We describe these in greater detail in Section IV.)  
Because we observe citations to a scientific publication both before and after BRC deposit (and 
because we observe control publications never linked to BRC deposits) we are able to identify 
how the pattern of citations to a scientific publication changes as the result of BRC deposit.  This 
test goes beyond the potentially biased test of whether BRC-linked articles are more or less 
highly cited than those that are not associated with BRC deposits. 
More precisely, if the availability of research materials through a BRC lowers the cost 
and raises the expected value of building on a specific research contribution, then the citation 
rate to BRC-linked scientific publications should increase after deposit has occurred.  Of course, 
measuring the impact of scientific research using citations implies that we must account for its 
form as count data that are skewed to the right (and likely over-dispersed relative to Poisson).  
Therefore, except where noted, we employ a negative binomial model of the citations produced 
per year for each scientific article in our dataset.  As well, the rate of citation to a given piece of 
research will vary with the calendar year, with the time elapsed since initial publication and 
across different article “families” (where a family is composed of a BRC-linked article and the 
two control articles).  Except where noted, the empirical specifications account for these effects 
through the use of age, year and family (or article) fixed effects.
13,14 
                                                 
12 We discuss our identification argument in more detail in Section V.  It is useful to note that we also check whether 
the timing of deposit is exogenous by testing for the presence of a pre-BRC deposit trend that “predicts” the act 
of BRC deposit.  As discussed in Section VI (Figure E), our results are robust to the inclusion of such a trend, and 
we do not find statistically significant evidence of such a trend. 
13 Several subtle issues, including the incidental parameters problem, arise in incorporating multiple fixed effect 
vectors into a negative binomial specification.  We have experimented with a range of alternative procedures and 
approaches, including the conditional negative binomial estimator suggested by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 
(1984) and the fixed effects estimator suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002).  Our core results are based on 
the traditional conditional fixed effects estimator with bootstrapped standard errors; however, our qualitative 
findings are consistent across these different procedures. 
14  When using a conditional fixed effects estimator, one citation year and one age fixed effect are not separately 
identified (Hall et al, 2005).  Since the main effect that we are interested in is separable from these effects, the 
precise specification we employ to overcome this identification issue does not at all affect our estimate of the 
impact of BRC deposit on citations.  In our estimation, we identify differences relative to age = 0, and relative to 
publication in years after 1975 (though, due to data limitations, we actually impose a single regressor on the years 
1975-1979).   19 
To disentangle the relative role played by selection versus the marginal impact of BRC 
deposit, our analysis first considers an estimator that identifies the average difference across the 
treatment and control groups, and estimates the change in citations resulting from BRC deposit 
itself.  Specifically, this baseline estimator is simply:   
(1)   , , ( ), , , , ( ; ) i j pubyear j t i j t j t t pubyear i i t CITES f BRC POST DEPOSIT e a b d f y - = + + + + -  
where aj is a fixed effect for each article family, bt is a year effect, d t - pubyear captures the age of 
the article, BRC is a dummy variable equal to one for those article linked at some point to a 
BRC, and POST-DEPOSIT is a dummy variable equal to one only for years after the material 
linked  to  the  article  is  accessioned  and  available  from  a  BRC.
15      While  this  specification 
provides an estimate of relative importance of the selection effect and the marginal impact of 
BRC  deposit,  the  potential  for  substantial  heterogeneity  among  articles  (even  within  article 
families) may lead to an upward estimate of the impact of BRC deposit on subsequent citation.  
We therefore examine (and base our core findings on) a series of estimates including article-
specific fixed effects (gi), as in the following specification: 
(2)   , , ( ), , , , ( ; ) i j pubyear j t i j t i t t pubyear i t CITES f POST DEPOSIT e g b d y - = + + + -     
Overall, we test for the impact of research-enhancing institutions by calculating how the citation 
rate for a scientific publication changes after BRC deposit, accounting for fixed differences in 
the  citation  rate  across  articles  and  relative  to  the  non-parametric  trend  in  citation  rates  for 
articles with similar characteristics.    
To test the preservation hypothesis, we can estimate whether the impact of BRC deposit 
changes with the time elapsed since BRC deposit itself.  As well, we can check for the presence 
of a pre-deposit time trend (which might argue against the exogeneity of the deposit event itself).  
We simply modify (2) to allow for pre-deposit and post-deposit dynamics: 
(3)
, , ( ), , ,
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15 Our empirical specifications also incorporate a “window” including the year prior to and year after the accession 
of  a  material  into  the  BRC  to  account  for  “announcement  effects”  and  for  potential  lags  in  availability  of 
materials.  
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where PRE-DEPOSIT(k) and POST-DEPOSIT(l) are dummy variables equal to one in the year 
when  a  BRC-linked  article  is  a  given  number  of  years  prior  to  or  after  the  deposit  event.  
Concerns  about  endogeneity  can  be  tested  by  examining  whether  the  coefficients  on  yPRE_k 
increase  in  the  few  years  prior  to  the  initial  announcement  of  BRC  involvement,  and  the 
preservation hypothesis can be tested by whether yPOST_l is increasing over time. 
Finally, we can use interaction effects to investigate whether the impact of BRC deposit 
depends on the economic or institutional conditions under which deposit occurs.   For example, 
our identification strategy focuses on the transfer of three distinct biological materials collections 
that were shifted from the peer-to-peer network to the ATCC, the leading BRC in the United 
States.  By interacting POST-DEPOSIT with a dummy variable for each of these collections, we 
can  separately  identify  whether  the  impact  of  BRC  deposit  varies  across  different  deposit 
“events.”   This same strategy can also be used to evaluate the mechanism underlying the impact 
of BRC deposit.  Conditional on being associated with one of the deposit “events,” the impact of 
the transfer from the private collection to the BRC differs only in terms of (a) the price charged 
by the BRC for access to the material and (b) the ex ante degree of perceived quality of those 
materials.  By interacting a price variable and measures of the “reputation” of the article or 
author  prior  to  deposit with  the  POST-DEPOSIT  measure,  we  are  able  to  evaluate  how  the 
returns to BRC deposit vary with changes in the transactional costs of access and the returns to 
research validation. 
 
V.  DATA 
V.A.  Data Construction and Sources 
To conduct this empirical analysis, we focus on a single institution, the American Type 
Culture Collection (ATCC).  Located in Manassas, Virginia, and founded in 1925, the ATCC 
maintains the largest culture collection in the world.  Although the ATCC is of unusually large 
size,  its  preservation,  certification,  and  distribution  functions  are  similar  to  those  of  other 
national and specialized public culture collections, such as the DSMZ in Germany and the Japan 
Collection of Microorganisms, and the Coriell Medical Research Institute and the Agricultural 
Research Service Culture Collection (NRRL) in the United States.   
In  addition  to  being  representative  of  major  culture  collections,  we  are  able  to  take 
advantage  of  the  characteristics  of  ATCC  in  order  to  address  four  key  empirical  challenges   21 
associated  with  implementing  the  differences-in-differences  strategy  we  describe  above:    (a) 
linking BRC deposits to research publications, (b) identifying a sample of publications that can 
be  used  to  disentangle  the  impact  of  selection  versus  the  marginal  impact  of  BRCs,  (c) 
constructing a sample of control articles, and (d) accounting for ambiguity in the date at which 
BRC deposits are available for access by other researchers. 
We  address  the  first  challenge  by  taking  advantage  of  the  reference  information 
maintained by the ATCC on all materials deposited in its collections.  For each material, ATCC 
documents the name of the original depositor, the date of deposit, and key scientific information 
associated with the deposit.  Specifically, ATCC lists the original research reference linked to 
deposited  materials.    Often,  the  original  article  associated  with  a  material  is  written  by  the 
depositor herself, although, in some cases, materials are deposited by researchers engaged in 
related work.  In its catalog of available cell cultures, ATCC lists both an originating article, as 
well as additional publications associated with each material.
16   
To overcome the second challenge, we take advantage of shocks that lead to the bulk 
transfer of materials into ATCC from other collections.  Specifically, we investigate the impact 
of the transfer of three special collections that were transferred from collections in the peer-to-
peer  network  to  ATCC  at  specific  points  in  time.    These  materials  transfers  occurred  when 
scientists  who  maintained  collections  within  the  peer-to-peer  network  moved  or  faced  an 
institutional funding limitation (unrelated to the specific collection) that spurred transfer to a 
BRC.  The first set of materials is drawn from the Tumor Immunology Bank (TIB), which was 
transferred  from  the  Salk  Institute  in  1981  due  to  Institute-wide  funding  pressures  and  was 
accessioned  beginning  in  1982.    Seventy-seven  articles  associated  with  the  TIB  collection 
deposits appear in the dataset.  The second set of articles is associated with materials in the 
Human  Tumor  Bank  (HTB).    Researchers  at  Sloan-Kettering  had  maintained  the  HTB  until 
institution-wide funding considerations led to its being transferred into ATCC beginning in 1981.  
Forty-four articles associated with HTB deposits appear in the dataset.   Finally, the third special 
collection  is  a  set  of  articles  associated  with  the  Gazdar  Collection.    This  collection  was 
transferred into the ATCC when Dr. Adi Gazdar left his position as Head of Tumor Cell Biology 
                                                 
16 The ATCC scientific and information technology staff report that the first reference article is typically the one 
most closely associated with the initial use of the biological material.  Historically, ATCC published its catalogs 
in print form. Currently, ATCC maintains its catalog online at www.ATCC.org.  
   22 
Section at the National Cancer Institutes, along with his collaborator, Dr. John Minna, to accept a 
position  at  UT-Southwestern.    The  materials  in  the  Gazdar  collection  were  accessioned 
beginning in 1994 and are linked to six research articles.   
It  is  important  to  note  two  characteristics  of  these  special  collections  prior  to  their 
accession by ATCC.  First, each of these special collections was publicly available and was 
maintained by researchers who actively exchanged the materials with colleagues.  Second, the 
inclusion of these materials in the special collections was tantamount to a commitment not to 
commercialize innovations derived from these  materials.   If scientists had intended to assert 
intellectual  property  rights  over  these  materials,  the  materials  would  not  have  been  freely 
circulated prior to their transfer into ATCC. 
It is also important to note that we choose to study these collections specifically because 
our interviews with researchers at ATCC suggested that their accession occurred for reasons that 
were  unrelated  to  changes  in  the  diffusion  of  knowledge  associated  with  their  materials.
17  
Specifically,  our  interviewees  suggested  that  the  funding  constraints  that  precipitated  the 
accession  of  the  TIB  and  HTB  collections  were  institution-wide  and  were  not  related  to 
particular characteristics of these collections or their increasing use by scientists in the few years 
directly prior to accession.  As well, the moves of Dr. Gazdar and Dr. Minna from the NCI to 
UT-Southwestern  appear  to  have  been  motivated  by  professional  considerations  unrelated  to 
changes in the perceived importance and use of the materials in the special collection they had 
maintained. 
That said, we are also able to take advantage of difference-in-differences techniques to 
evaluate whether the data suggest that, indeed, the accession of these materials was not preceded 
by a significant boost in their use.  In particular, since the materials included in each collection 
are  associated  with  articles  which  are  published  at  different  points  in  time,  and  each  of  the 
special collections is moved at a given point in time, the articles associated with each collection 
vary in terms of how much time has elapsed between initial publication and BRC deposit.  This 
allows us to estimate the impact of BRC deposit separately from the impact of article age.  By 
examining the trend in citations to special collections’ articles in the years preceding deposit (and 
                                                 
17  We are grateful to Dr. Raymond Cypess, President and CEO of the ATCC, and Dr. Robert Hay, Director of the 
Department of Cell Biology at ATCC, as well as other ATCC staff members, in particular for discussions on the 
special collections and the history of ATCC.  
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finding these to be insignificant, although the post-deposit trends are significant), we are able to 
conclude with some degree of confidence that the “trigger events” leading to the accession of 
three  collections  we  study  were  unrelated  to  pre-deposit  changes  in  intrinsic  value  of  the 
knowledge associated with their materials. 
To address the third challenge, we match each BRC-affiliated article with two types of 
control articles.  We choose these with the aim of ensuring that the control articles are as similar 
to the BRC-associated article on as many observable dimensions as possible in order to ensure 
that  differences  in  citation  rates  will  reflect  the  impact  of  article-specific  differences  on 
knowledge diffusion.  The first set of controls is composed of the set of research articles that 
immediately precedes the article associated with each ATCC deposit in the journal in which the 
ATCC-linked article was published (we refer to these as the Nearest Neighbor controls).
18  For 
example, if an ATCC-associated publication were the third article in the June 14, 1986 issue of 
Cell, our control article would be the second article within that same issue.
19  By matching 
control articles to treatment articles in this way, we attempt to minimize heterogeneity associated 
with  the  publication  process.    Specifically,  this  method  ensures  that  both  the  BRC-affiliated 
article and the control article have undergone the same type of scientific review process and have 
been published at the same moment in time.  Comparing the citations by future researchers to 
these  articles  provides  an  indication  of  their  relative  impact,  conditional  on  these  ex  ante 
similarities.  Our second set of control articles is based on identifying the most-related article in 
the same volume of the journal that the BRC-linked article was published (we refer to this set as 
the Most-Related Article controls).  To accomplish this, we take advantage of an online search 
algorithm  developed  by  the  National  Library  of  Medicine  (NLM)  that  allows  PUBMED  to 
identify a set of articles that mostly closely resembles a selected article and rank them according 
to similarity.  This algorithm determines similarity rankings based on the extent to which articles 
share terms in their title, abstract, and Medical Subject Headings (MeSH).
20  From the set of 
                                                 
18 We identify Nearest Neighbor controls for each BRC-affiliated by using the PUBMED database of scientific 
journals.  PUBMED is a database and search engine constructed and maintained by the National Library of 
Medicine that provides access to article information contained in the MEDLINE database of journal citations and 
abstracts.  A complete description of PUBMED and MEDLINE can be found at www.pubmed.com. 
19 When the ATCC-associated article is the lead article, we use the second article in that issue as the control. 
20 Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) headings are subject headings developed by the National Library of Medicine 
to  help  index  articles  in  the  life  sciences.    They  are  similar  in  function  to  Journal  of  Economic  Literature 
classifications.  A more complete description of the NLM matching algorithm appears at: 
   http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query/static/computation.html.    24 
articles  identified  by  NLM  as  related  to  the  focal  article,  we  select  the  most  related  article 
published in the same publication year.
21  
Each of the two control groups provides a useful comparison to the BRC-linked articles.  
The  Nearest  Neighbor  method  minimizes  the  heterogeneity  associated  with  the  publication 
process  and  eliminates  heterogeneity  associated  with  publication  timing;  the  Most-Related 
Article accounts for field-specific within-journal heterogeneity.  This second type of control will 
be particularly important for more general-interest journals (e.g., Nature versus the Journal of 
Cell Biology).  By including this second control group, we can account for differences in citation 
patterns in a way that is independent of field-specific norms. 
To address the fourth challenge (accounting for ambiguity in the date at which BRC 
deposits are available for access by other researchers), our dataset accommodates institutional 
aspects of the accession process.  On the one hand, prior to the date of formal accession, the 
research community becomes informed about collections transfer through formal announcements 
and informal communications.  As a result, materials that are deposited are often known to be 
part of the transfer prior to the official accession date.  On the other hand, because of the rigorous 
procedures  used  to  accession  materials  (and  short-term  limitations  on  the  supply  of  some 
materials),  accessioned  materials  are  sometimes  not  made  fully  available  to  the  research 
community until many months after the official accession date.  In some cases, materials in the 
HTB and TIB collections took up to 24 months to be declared officially available from ATCC.  
We explicitly account for the impact of this in our empirical analysis by incorporating a “transfer 
window,” including the year before, the year of, and the year following the official accession 
date.  By including this window, our analysis focuses on how the pattern of citation changes 
from a period prior to the deposit announcement and subsequent to its availability through a 
BRC. 
Having assembled this dataset of treatment and control articles, we compile additional 
article-specific  data  and  tabulate  annual  citation  counts  from  the  Science  Citation  Index 
Expanded  (SCI).    The  Science  Citation  Index  is  a  database  maintained  by  the  Institute  for 
Scientific Information (ISI) that records reference information for nearly six thousand scientific 
and  technical  journals  in  approximately  150  disciplines.    The  SCI  has  been  widely  used  in 
                                                 
21 In some cases, no article in the same volume of the journal qualifies as sufficiently related according to the NLM 
algorithm.  In these instances, we rely on the “Nearest Article” control.    25 
economics, sociology, and management research, as well as in bibliometric studies, to quantify 
scientists’ research output, measure research collaboration, and track the diffusion of scientific 
knowledge – prominent examples in economics include Levin and Stephan [1991]; Adams and 
Griliches [1998]; Henderson and Cockburn [1998]; and Zucker and Darby [1998]. 
 
V.B.  Summary Statistics 
Table I provides variable names and definitions and Table II reports summary statistics.  
The complete dataset contains the special collections sub-samples and the two sets of associated 
control articles.  For each article in the dataset, we track citations beginning in the year in which 
the article was published and continuing until 2001.  The total number of articles in the dataset is 
289, and the total number of article-year observations is 6475.  The overall distribution of ages of 
articles in the sample is reflected in Figure I.  This distribution is centered around 1981-1982, 
which are the years in which the TIB and HTB collections, respectively, entered into the ATCC. 
The key dependent variable in our analysis is FORWARD CITATIONS, the number of 
articles that reference the focal article in a given year.  The average level of citations received by 
articles in this dataset is 6.23, which is quite high relative to the average among all academic 
articles.  In part, this occurs because the publications associated with BRC deposits (and their 
associated control articles) tend to appear in top-tier journals, such as Science, Nature, and Cell.  
Consistent with most citation analysis, the distribution of citation counts is quite skewed (Figure 
II).  By the end of 2001, the average article in our sample has received more than 79 total 
citations. 
Key control variables in the analysis are the calendar YEAR, which ranges from 1970 to 
2001, and AGE, which equals the number of years since the article’s initial publication.  For 
each article, we also record a PUBLICATION YEAR.  For articles in the special collections we 
also include a DEPOSIT YEAR, which reflects the year in which the material associated with 
that article was accessioned into the ATCC collection.  We also track PRICE for each of the 
materials in the special collections; this averages approximately $233 per material. 
  While our analysis focuses mostly on specifications that address article heterogeneity by 
including article fixed effects, we have collected characteristics about each of the articles in our 
sample.  Specifically, we have assembled information on the number of pages for each article    
(#  PAGES),  the  number  of  authors  (#  AUTHORS),  and  the  number  of  backward  citations   26 
(BACKWARD CITATIONS).  Although SCI data do not make it possible for all articles, we 
record  whenever  possible  whether  the  lead  author  is  associated  with  a  university 
(UNIVERSITY) or government institution (GOVERNMENT) and whether their institution is 
located in the United States or another country (NON-US).  University researchers comprise the 
majority  of  lead  authors  in  the  sample  (51%);  authors  affiliated  with  a  government  agency 
comprise 18% of lead authors.  The vast majority of lead authors are from U.S. institutions; 29% 
of authors are from institutions outside of the United States.  For our extended analyses, we also 
compute the fraction of papers associated with lead authors from a set of top university biology 
departments (TOP UNIVERSITY). 
 
V.C.  Comparing citations to BRC-associated articles versus control group articles. 
Table III compares the BRC-linked articles to the control groups.  Strikingly, articles 
associated with BRC deposits receive significantly more citations than matched control articles.  
BRC-associated articles receive, on average, more than four times as many citations as Nearest 
Neighbor  controls,  and  more  than  260%  more  citations  than  Most-Related  Article  controls.  
These substantial differences in overall citation exist, even though both control groups appear in 
the same journal, went through the same review process, and (particularly in the case of the 
Most-Related Article controls) are matched closely in terms of subject area. 
Figures III-1 and III-2 portray the disparity between these groups over time, comparing 
average citations by article age for each control group.  Figure III-1 compares citation levels.  
For each control group, the number of citations increases over the first few years, peaking around 
the third or fourth year after publication, and deteriorating at various rates over time.  In each of 
the first twenty years after publication (excepting for the publication year, in which all articles 
receive few citations), the average BRC-associated article receives substantially more citations 
than control group articles.  Moreover, Figure III-2 demonstrates that the “citation premium” 
received by BRC-associated articles persists or increases, as a percentage of citations, over the 
first twenty years after an article’s publication. 
These  conditional  means  suggest  that  strong  differences  exist  between  BRC-linked 
articles and those in the control groups.  While the differences in the citation rates for BRC vs. 
control articles are substantial and are of primary interest in the study, it is interesting to note that 
important  differences  exist  between  the  citation  counts  of  most-related  article  vs.  nearest   27 
neighbor controls.  The citation pattern for BRC articles is more similar to the most-related 
article controls than those of nearest neighbor controls.  In our analysis, we check the robustness 
of our results to including each control group separately. 
 
VI.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our  empirical  approach  relies  on  a  differences-in-differences  analysis  that  separately 
identifies selection effects from the marginal impact of ATCC deposit.  This strategy relies on 
observing BRC-linked articles in two distinct institutional environments, associated with a pre-
deposit and post-deposit period.  By comparing citation patterns across article families (i.e., 
comparing articles eventually deposited in BRCs with those that are not) and across deposit-
status within article (i.e., whether a particular article has yet been deposited), we can precisely 
identify the marginal impact of BRC deposit on the rate of knowledge diffusion.  Specifically, 
after controlling for other factors, a positive and significant effect on BRC ARTICLE implies a 
selection effect (this coefficient reflects the additional citations received by the set of articles that 
are  ultimately  accessioned  into  the  BRC),  while  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  BRC 
ARTICLE, POST-DEPOSIT indicates the estimated marginal impact of BRCs (this coefficient 
measures the “boost” in citations received by BRC-accessioned articles in the period following 
their deposit, controlling for the fact that they were articles that were, ultimately, accessioned).  
It is useful to recall that we incorporate a three-year “window” for the period of time between the 
announcement that materials will be accessioned by ATCC and the time when they are readily 
available (and we also check the robustness of our results to the inclusion or exclusion of data 
within the window period).  Over the specifications, the results are consistent with statistically 
and  economically  significant  evidence  for  selection  into  and  the  marginal  impact  of  BRC 
deposit.  
 
VI.A.  Baseline Analysis 
  Our analysis begins in Table IV, where we begin to distinguish the selection effect from 
the institutional impact of BRCs.   Recall that specifications that include article family effects 
allow us to separately identify both the selection and marginal effects.  Equations (4-1) and (4-2) 
present OLS specifications with ln(FORWARD CITATIONS) as the dependent variable.  The 
specifications differ in that (4-1) includes AGE fixed effects, while (4-2) also includes Article   28 
Family  fixed  effects  as  well  as  Year  fixed  effects.    The  results  are  similar.    In  (4-1),  the 
coefficients  on  both  BRC-ARTICLE  and  BRC-ARTICLE,  POST-DEPOSIT  suggest  a 
significant impact of BRC association.  On average, articles that are ultimately linked to BRC 
deposits  have  a  46.5%  higher  citation  rate  (relative  to  the  control  articles  in  their  “article 
families”), and receive an additional 61.0% increase in their citation rate after BRC deposit.  
BRC-linked articles also experience a citation boost during the WINDOW PERIOD, although 
the  boost  associated  with  the  window  period  (35.1%)  is  significantly  smaller  than  that 
experienced in the years after accession.   These results suggest that both selection and accession 
effects impact citation rates in a statistically significant and economically important way:  BRC-
linked articles are cited more frequently and receive an additional “boost” in the years following 
BRC deposit.  In these and in all subsequent specifications, year and article age fixed effects are 
each jointly significant (though the interpretation of year and age fixed effect coefficients in this 
context is subtle [Hall et al, 2005]). 
  Though useful as a preliminary exercise, OLS is inappropriate for inference as citation 
data are composed of highly skewed count data.  We therefore employ a conditional fixed effects 
negative  binomial  specification  in  the  remainder  of  the  analysis.    We  report  in  brackets  the 
coefficients for these models as incidence-rate ratios (a coefficient equal to one implies no effect 
on  FORWARD  CITATIONS,  whereas  a  coefficient  equal  to  1.50  implies  a  50%  boost  to 
FORWARD CITATIONS).  For each of these models, we compute bootstrapped standard errors, 
clustered either by  article families or article dummies, depending on the set of fixed effects 
included in the specification [MacKinnon, 2002].  (Underneath the bracketed IRRs, we report the 
non-exponentiated  regression  coefficients,  along  with  their  associated  bootstrapped  standard 
errors in parentheses.)  We do not report the significance of tests of joint restrictions on the 
article  family  or  article  fixed  effects,  as  these  are  not  computed  in  conditional  fixed  effects 
models. 
The first of these specifications (4-3) presents a useful comparison to (4-2), insofar as it 
includes an identical set of regressors.  After accounting for citations as skewed count data, we 
easily reject the null of no selection and no marginal effect.  Indeed, the estimated coefficients 
are larger than those associated with the OLS specifications (e.g., citation rates are estimated to 
increase more than 90% after BRC deposit).  In (4-4), the second of these specifications, we 
disaggregate the selection effect by special collection, replacing BRC-ARTICLE with dummy   29 
variables for each of the three special collections, while retaining the common BRC-ARTICLE, 
POST-DEPOSIT dummy.  The results demonstrate that the selection effect is significant and 
economically substantial for each collection and suggest that the selection effect is greatest for 
the Gazdar collection.   
Overall, the findings in (4-1) through (4-4) provide evidence of both a selection effect 
and  a  marginal  impact  of  BRCs  on  the  diffusion  of  scientific  knowledge.    While  these 
specifications separately identify the selection and the marginal impact of BRCs, we have so far 
ignored  the  substantial  variability  among  articles,  even  within  article  families.    As  a 
consequence,  we  introduce  a  number  of  specifications  that  include  article  fixed  effects.  
Although these do not identify the average selection effect, they do implement a more precise 
control structure for the impact of individual articles.  In these specifications, the coefficient on 
BRC-ARTICLE, POST-DEPOSIT reflects the “boost” in citation rate that an article receives 
after  its  key  material  is  accessioned  (and  after  the  deposit  window  has  elapsed).
22    As 
demonstrated in (4-5), the average article is estimated to experience a 135.0% citation boost after 
BRC  accession  (and  a  61.2%  boost  in  citations  during  the  WINDOW  PERIOD),  even  after 
controlling for all article, age and year-specific effects.  This suggests that, even controlling for 
the overall impact of an article over time, BRC-associated articles experience an economically 
substantial increase in knowledge diffusion (controlling for year and article age).  We view this 
as one of the core findings in our analysis. 
 
VI.B.  Robustness to Alternative Control Groups and Specifications 
Table V explores the robustness of the analysis in Table IV to alternative control groups 
and specifications.  Employing the same article fixed effects approach as in (4-5), (5-1) finds that 
the impact of deposit varies by collection.  Articles associated with the HTB and TIB collections 
experience  post-deposit  citations  boosts  of  182%  and  128%,  respectively,  while  the  articles 
associated with the Gazdar collection experience only a 55% post-deposit citations boost.  The 
lower impact of deposit on citations experienced by the Gazdar articles may be an artifact of 
their being accessioned later (and, thus, having a smaller number of years over which a post-
deposit effect could be observed).  Equations (5-2) and (5-3) following the basic specification 
                                                 
22  In these specifications, the pre-deposit period for BRC-accessioned articles effectively serves as the control for 
identifying  the  post-deposit  impact  on  FORWARD  CITATIONS.    The  Most-Related  Article  and  Nearest 
Neighbor Articles are useful in these specifications for helping to establish year and article age effects.    30 
implemented in (4-3), but include only the nearest neighbor and most-related article controls, 
respectively.    The  overall  post-deposit  effect  remains  positive  in  both  cases,  though  the 
magnitude of the effect is significantly higher when compared to the “most related” control.  In 
(5-4), we simply drop the data associated with the window period.  The results are similar to our 
core model. 
 
VI.C.  Exploring Persistence and Timing 
Our analysis so far has assumed that BRC-linked articles and the control articles follow a 
similar time trend.  We relax this assumption in Table VI, and explore the impact of a BRC-
linked time trend in several ways.  In (6-1), we introduce a separate BRC-article time trend to 
account for the possibility that articles associated with BRC deposits may follow a different 
trajectory with respect to the timing of their citations.  BRC-ARTICLE*TIME TREND does 
enter positively and significantly, suggesting that the citation rate to BRC-associated articles 
increases  over  time.    Nonetheless,  BRC-ARTICLE,  POST-DEPOSIT  remains  positive, 
significant,  and  of  an  important  economic  magnitude  (46.0%).    This  suggests  that,  although 
BRC-affiliated articles are characterized by an additional upward citation trend, these articles 
also experience a post-deposit citation boost even when controlling for this trend (and  year, 
article age, and article fixed effects). 
  Simply allowing a BRC-linked time trend is inadequate, however, for two reasons.  First, 
if the time trend is statistically significant in the years prior to deposit, this would cast doubt on 
the exogeneity of the timing of deposit (e.g., a third factor was driving both the deposit decision 
and the increased citation rate).  Second, according to the preservation hypothesis, the impact of 
BRC deposit should increase over time, and so the presence of a post-deposit positive time trend 
actually provides additional evidence of the marginal impact of BRCs on knowledge diffusion.  
In other  words, rather than simply needing to  demonstrate robustness  to a BRC-linked time 
trend, we need to evaluate the pre-deposit and post-deposit trend separately.  
We implement this idea in (6-2) and Figure IV.  Though positive, the pre-deposit time 
trend is insignificant.  In contrast, the post-deposit time trend is positive and significant (and the 
coefficient on BRC-ARTICLE, POST-DEPOSIT is statistically and quantitatively significant).  
According to (6-2), the post-deposit citation boost increases by 3.7% in each year that elapses 
after the deposit date.  To explore these ideas in greater detail, Figure IV presents a specification   31 
similar  to  Equation  (3),  but  with  separate  dummy  variables  for  each  year  preceding  and 
following  BRC-deposit (along with the complete set of  article, age, and calendar  year fixed 
effects).    Figure  IV  plots  each  coefficient  (in  terms  of  the  incidence-rate  ratio  minus  one), 
excluding the years associated with the accession window (all effects are computed relative to 
the window period).  Two findings stand out.  First, the pre-deposit citation pattern does not 
suggest a clear upward trend in the nine years prior to accession; however, the third and second 
years prior to the window period do appear to show a slight uptick in forward citations.  This 
uptick is, however, sensitive to the estimation technique and we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the pre-deposit effect in the second year prior to deposit is statistically greater than the effect in 
the fourth year prior to deposit.
23  Nonetheless, the result suggests some degree of caution in 
concluding  that  the  special  collections  deposits  are  econometrically  exogenous.    The  second 
finding does, however, breed substantial confidence BRC-accession has a significant marginal 
impact on FORWARD CITATIONS relative to the pre-deposit period.  There is a sizeable and 
near  continuous  increase  in  the  citation  boost  in  the  years  following  deposit.    While  BRC-
affiliated articles experience only a 20% citation boost in the years immediately after accession, 
this effect increases to over 100% by ten years after deposit (and continues to increase from 
there).  In other words, while the immediate impact is positive but modest, the influence of BRC 
deposit over time becomes larger, consistent with the preservation hypothesis.  Whereas most 
research is relevant and used as an input in follow-on research for only a few years following 
publication, BRC-accession leads research to be “forgotten” at a significantly lower rate.  
Overall, the citation evidence is principally consistent with the hypothesis that the Special 
Collections were not accessioned because the scientific community recognized these materials as 
increasingly important prior to their deposit and is quite consistent with the hypothesis that BRC-
accession accelerated the use of knowledge associated with those materials. 
 
VI.D.   Exploring the Drivers of Marginal Impact – Transactions Costs vs. Certification 
The  results  in  Tables  V  through  VI  document  a  significant  and  long-lived  marginal 
impact of BRCs on FORWARD CITATIONS.  Our analysis so far, however, has not attempted 
to identify the characteristics of BRCs that drive these results.   At least two sets of  factors 
                                                 
23  In particular, this uptick does not appear in models using the fixed effects estimator with robust standard errors, whose use is 
recommended by recent results about the relative size and importance of the small sample versus asymptotic bias arising in 
count data models (Allison and Waterman, 2002; Greene, 2004).    32 
consistent with Mokyr’s framework [2002] could be at work.  First, BRC-accession could drive 
down the costs of obtaining research materials in comparison to prior institutional arrangements 
(i.e., which could be described as a reduction in transaction costs).  Second, BRC-accession 
could also yield a certification effect, which increases the scientific community’s belief in the 
fidelity of materials associated with BRCs and result in increased use of knowledge associated 
with  deposited  materials.    Our  interviews  with  biologists  suggest  that  both  factors  are 
important.
24 
Decomposing the marginal impact of BRCs into separate cost-based and certification-
based  components  is  difficult  in  the  context  of  a  single  institution  or  in  the  absence  of  an 
experiment that affects these factors in different ways.  Although our analysis is limited to one 
institution, we can take advantage of the characteristics of our experiment and data to obtain 
suggestive evidence regarding the presence of cost-reduction and certification effects.  The key 
aspect of the experiment that we can exploit is that the movement of the special collections from 
their prior host institutions into ATCC involves a shift in the costs of accessing those materials 
and in the level of certification associated with each material.  Focusing on changes in access 
costs, two pieces of evidence can suggest the presence of cost-reduction effects.  First, we know 
the PRICE at which each of the materials in the special collections is available from ATCC.  If 
access costs decrease when materials are shifted into ATCC, we would expect the impact of 
these cost reductions to be less for materials with a higher PRICE.  Thus, we would anticipate 
that the incidence rate ratio for PRICE would be below unity.  Second, we can take advantage of 
the fact that, while the changes in access costs should be the same within collections (controlling 
for  PRICE),  they  will  likely  differ  systematically  across  collections,  as  each  of  the  special 
collections had different access costs prior to deposit but end up with equal access costs after 
BRC-deposit. 
This fact also helps us identify certification effects:  Because the changes in access costs 
are  constant  within  collection  (when  controlling  for  PRICE),  systematic  within-collection 
differences  in  the  way  in  which  deposit  impacts  follow-on  research  will  reflect  certification 
effects rather than changes in access costs.  In particular, we hypothesize that the certification 
                                                 
24  For example, Arnold Demain of MIT’s Department of Biology, explained that “it would probably be better if all (or, at least, very many) 
collections were moved to ATCC, because people don’t have the time or training to properly maintain their own collections.”  Thus, he 
continued,  scientists  can  place  greater  trust  in  materials  they  obtain  from  ATCC  than  from  scientists  directly.    He  also  noted  in  our 
conversation,  however,  that  obtaining  materials  through  ATCC  was  often  easier  than  dealing  with  scientists  directly,  particularly  as 
universities become increasingly concerned with intellectual property rights.   33 
boost will be greater for individuals that were less prominent prior to deposit and for articles that 
were less prominent prior to deposit. 
  We investigate these mechanisms in Table VII.
25  Equation (7-1) provides evidence that, 
indeed,  access  costs  affect  the  extent  of  follow-on  research.    PRICE  *  POST-DEPOSIT  is 
negative,  statistically  significant,  and  of  an  economically  significant  magnitude  for  each 
collection,  suggesting  that  materials  for  which  access  costs  are  relatively  higher  (i.e.,  those 
materials available at a PRICE greater than their collection average) are associated with a lower 
impact of BRC deposit.
26 
We investigate certification effects by evaluating whether variations in article and author 
prominence before deposit have an impact on post-deposit citations.  To do so, we must control 
for factors that affect the cost of access to materials, including PRICE and the identity of the 
special  collection  with  which  the  deposit  is  associated.    Controlling  for  these  factors,  the 
estimates  in  (7-2)  suggests  that  NON-US  articles  do  receive  an  additional  boost  in  citations 
relative  to  articles  with  US-based  authors.    (NON-US  *  HTB-ARTICLE  *  POST-DEPOSIT 
enters positively and significantly in each equation, and a test of joint restrictions finds NON-US 
* HTB-ARTICLE * POST-DEPOSIT and NON-US * TIB-ARTICLE * POST-DEPOSIT to be 
jointly significant at the 1% level.)
27  We also test whether a articles in a collection that were less 
prominent prior to deposit (greater than collection median citations) or that were authored by 
researchers  from  less  prominent  institutions  (not  TOP  UNIVERSITY)  experienced  a  greater 
citation boost after accession than other articles in their collection.  The coefficients on these 
variables are not significant, however, and are not reported in Table VII.  The result described 
above that the within-collection citation boost is higher for NON-US authors is, however, robust 
across specifications.  Overall, we interpret these results as providing suggestive evidence that 
both  access  costs  and  certification  effects  contribute  to  the  impact  of  BRC  deposit  on  the 
exploitation of scientific knowledge and that these can be identified separately. 
 
                                                 
25  Note that the analysis in Table 7 does not include the Gazdar collection, because we were unable to determine a 
sufficiently large number of Gazdar article characteristics with sufficient certainty (though the results are robust 
to the inclusion of Gazdar data of which we are confident). 
26  PRICE has been demeaned in the analysis at the level of the Special Collection, so that values of PRICE reflect 
variation from the average price of all materials in its collection.  
27 Note that we cannot conduct this test for the Gazdar collection, since each of its depositors is US-based. 
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VII.  DISCUSSION 
While growth theorists, industrial organization economists, and economic historians have 
each come to place increasing importance on the role of cumulativeness in sustaining innovation, 
little research has directly addressed the microeconomic conditions supporting cumulativeness, 
or  provided  direct  statistical  evidence  about  the  impact  of  institutions  in  enhancing  the 
cumulative knowledge production process.  In this paper, we investigate the role of institutions in 
this process directly.  Specifically, we consider research-enhancing institutions, which facilitate 
step-by-step scientific and technical progress by leveraging the potential of research from one 
generation to serve as “seed corn” for future generations. 
  Our principal contribution has been to provide evidence about the role of BRCs as a quite 
specific  (and  somewhat  “invisible”)  institution  within  the  life  sciences  that  impact  the 
cumulativeness of research in that field.  We separated out a selection effect (which turned out to 
be  quite  important)  from  the  marginal  impact  of  the  institution  in  enhancing  knowledge 
diffusion, and identified suggestive evidence that both reduced access  costs and certification 
benefits play a role in driving the marginal impact of BRCs on follow-on research.  Each of these 
effects is significant for understanding the role of this institution.  On one hand, the BRC we 
study  plays  an  important  role  in  the  process  of  knowledge  cumulation  in  life  sciences  by 
identifying and preserve research materials that are, themselves, important to biological research.  
At the same time, BRCs enhance the value of the materials they collect, thus facilitating the 
process of standing on the shoulders of prior research.  Our evidence suggests that this occurs 
both because BRCs lower the transactions costs associated with obtaining important research 
materials  and  because  accessioned  materials,  especially  those  of  non-US-based  researchers, 
appear  certified  for  potential  follow-on  researchers.    Our  results  are  certainly  subject  to  the 
caveats associated with any research premised on the use of citation data; however, our estimates 
do  suggest  that  BRCs  provide  precisely  the  type  of  boost  that  is  at  the  cornerstone  of  the 
economics of cumulative knowledge production. 
  Our framework and results point to several areas for future research.  First, while we 
present suggestive evidence about the mechanisms underlying the citations boost associated with 
BRC-deposit,  future  research  could  exploit  differences  between  materials  in  their  level  of 
certification and differences in the level of certification across different BRCs as sources of 
variation to further disentangle these two different functions of BRCs.  Second, whereas our   35 
econometric exercise exploits specific instances associated with plausibly exogenous deposits, 
the  economics  of  research-enhancing  institutions  depends,  by  and  large,  on  the  endogenous 
decision  by  individual  researchers  to  allow  their  knowledge  to  become  accessible  through 
research-enhancing institutions.  Mukherjee and Stern [2004], for example, address this issue in 
the context of a simple overlapping generations model that identifies the key factors underlying 
this endogenous choice, deriving conditions under which investments in institutions that support 
disclosure and cumulativeness provide a social welfare benefit.  Additional research in this vein 
may focus in a useful way on the incentives for individual scientists and scientific fields to 
develop research-enhancing institutions as well as study additional such institutions. 
  In addition, it is important to emphasize that the choice to deposit materials in BRCs (or 
disclose knowledge through other research-enhancing institutions) is sensitive to parameters that 
are themselves influenced by public policy.  Stern (2004) undertakes a thorough policy analysis 
of the specific issues relating to BRCs per se.  However, the insights associated with this study 
are  more  general.    For  example,  most  policy  debates  regarding  federal  research  investments 
focus on expanding the level of research conducted; in contrast, this line of research raises the 
point that it may be optimal to shift funds towards institutions and other mechanisms to ensure 
that knowledge, once produced with public funds, is made accessible to future research efforts. 
  Finally, our empirical approach highlights an important but often overlooked problem in 
the measurement of knowledge spillovers.  Simply put, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of 
institutions from the knowledge that is accessible from those institutions.  While sharp insights 
have been developed over the past decade about the relationship between university research and 
follow-on  commercialization,  these  prior  studies  have  not  been  able  to  clarify  whether  the 
“boost” associated with university research is the result of differences in the type of research 
conducted or the rules and policies governing the disclosure and dissemination of university 
research results.  However, these rules are precisely what is at issue in terms of contemporary 
policy discussions [Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998; David, 2001; 
Murray, 2002].  Murray and Stern [2005] appears to be a useful effort at applying the techniques 
we develop here to address that particular question.  More broadly, however, we believe the 
careful exploitation of experiments and difference-in-differences techniques constitutes a fruitful 
and as yet underexploited methodology for investigating the impact of institutions on knowledge 
flows.   36 
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TABLE I 
VARIABLES & DEFINITIONS 
 








# of FORWARD CITATIONS from publication date to YEARt-1  SCI 
YEAR  Year  SCI 
AGE  Year –Article Publication Year  SCI 
ARTICLE CHARACTERISTICS 
BRC ARTICLE  Dummy variable equal to 1 if Article is associated with a material deposited in 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if Article is referenced by BRC deposit and YEAR 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if Article is referenced by BRC deposit and YEAR 
> DEPOSIT YEAR + 1 (i.e., deposit has already occurred and DEPOSIT 
WINDOW PERIOD already passed) 
ATCC 
COLLECTION  Dummy variable indicating the collection with which the article is associated 
(1 = Gazdar Collection; 2 = Tumor Immunology Bank (TIB); 3 = Human 
Tumor Bank (HTB)) 
Gazdar Collection:  This collection was transferred into the ATCC when Dr. 
Adi Gazdar left his position as Head of Tumor Cell Biology Section at the 
National Cancer Institutes, along with his collaborator, Dr. John Minna, to 
become Professor of Pathology at the Hamon center for Therapeutic Oncology 
at UT Southwestern.  The Gazdar collection was incorporated into ATCC over 
a number of years; the materials examined in this paper were accessioned into 
in 1994. 
TIB Collection:  The Tumor Immunology Bank (TIB) was created at ATCC 
when a collection was transferred from the Salk Institute in 1981, and 
accessioned into the ATCC over the next few years. 
HTB Collection:  The Human Tumor Bank was maintained at Sloan-Kettering 
until 1981; it was accessioned into the ATCC collection over the next few 
years. 
ATCC 
DEPOSIT YEAR  Year in which the material associated with Article j is “accessioned” and 
available for purchase through the ATCC 
ATCC 
PUBLICATION YEAR  Year in which Article j is published  SCI 
BACKWARD 
CITATIONS 
Number of articles cited by Article j  SCI 
# PAGES  Count of the number of pages in Article j  SCI 
# AUTHORS  Count of the number of authors of Article j  SCI 
UNIVERSITY LEAD 
AUTHOR 






Dummy variable equal to 1 if lead author is associated with a government-





Dummy variable equal to 1 if lead author is associated with an institution 





Dummy variable equal to 1 if lead author is associated with a private 
institution; 0 otherwise 
SCI; author 
verification 
TOP UNIVERSITY  Dummy variable equal to 1 if lead author is associated with a university 
identified by NSF at one of Top 25 universities federally financed R&D 
expenditures in the biological sciences 
NSF; author 
verification  
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TABLE II 
MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
  
VARIABLE  N  MEAN  STANDARD 
DEVIATION  MIN  MAX 
CITATION-YEAR CHARACTERISTICS 
FORWARD CITATIONS  6475  6.23  14.32  0  186 
CUMULATIVE 
CITATIONS 
6475  79.28  1616.51  0  2333 
YEAR  6475  1989.79   7.21  1970  2001 
AGE  6475  11.26  7.22  0  31 
ARTICLE CHARACTERISTICS (N=289 total articles) 
TOTAL CITATIONS  289  140.10  238.94  0  2333 
PUBLICATION YEAR  289  1979.42  4.58  1970  1992 
BRC ARTICLE  289  0.37  0.48  0  1 
DEPOSIT YEAR
*  108  1983.63  3.47  1981  1994 
PRICE
*  108  233.12  42.60  167  270 
# PAGES  287  7.09  6.96  0  69 
# AUTHORS  288  4.71  4.24  0  57 
BACKWARD CITATIONS  272  31.33  29. 27  0  401 
UNIVERSITY^  236  0.51  0.50  0  1 
GOVERNMENT^  236  0.18  0.39  0  1 
NON-US^  216  0.29  0.45  0  1 
TOP UNIVERSITY^  236  0.19  0.45  0  1 
 
* DEPOSIT YEAR & PRICE are only meaningful for articles associated with BRC deposits. 
^  Institutional affiliations are not available for some of the publications. 
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TABLE III 
MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS, 
BY CONTROL GROUP 
 
  Treatment 









#PAPERS  108  108  73 
PAPER-YEARS  2418  2415  1642 



















* There are fewer Most-Related Control Articles than Treatment Articles, because the NIH algorithm is occasionally 
unable to identify a “most-related article” in the same year and journal as the Treatment Article. 
  





Dep Var =  
ln(FORWARD CITATIONS)* 
 
CONDITIONAL FIXED EFFECTS NEG BINOMIAL 
 [Incidence-Rate Ratios reported in brackets] 
Non-exponentiated coefficients reported without brackets 
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors reported in parentheses) 
Dep Var = FORWARD CITATIONS 
 
(4-1) 
Base Model:  BRC 
Effect with Age 
FEs only 
(4-2) 
Base Model, with 





















0.732    
(0.174) 










0.342    
(0.157) 
[1.407] 
0.341     
(0.161) 
[1.612] 











0.649    
(0.190) 
[1.934] 







      [2.110] 
0.747    
(0.229) 
 




GAZDAR-ARTICLE        [2.658] 






         
Article Family FEs = 0    F-stat  5.9*10
5 
p-value  0.00    Included    Included   
Article FEs = 0            Included 
Age FEs = 0  F-stat  16.84 
p-value  0.00 
F-stat  14.77 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2    1608.38 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2    1285.09 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2    1007.92 
p-value  0.00 
Year FEs = 0
^    F-stat  2.81 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2    110.98 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2    224.64 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2    182.89 
p-value  0.00 
Regression Statistics 
R-squared  0.26  0.51       
Log-likelihood      -13610.17  13607.11  -11795.38 
# of Observations  6475  6475  6371  6371  6298 
*  Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by article group, are in parentheses. 
^  Year FEs included for 1980-2001; 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 grouped. 
  
  43 
TABLE V 
ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE CONTROL GROUPS 
AND SPECIFICATIONS 
 
CONDITIONAL FIXED EFFECTS NEG BINOMIAL 
[Incidence-Rate Ratios reported in brackets] 
Non-exponentiated coefficients reported without brackets 
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors reported in parentheses) 
Dep Var = FORWARD CITATIONS 
(5-1)  (5-2)  (5-3)  (5-4) 
 
 
















0.483    
(0.150) 
[1.213] 
0.193    
(0.128) 
[1.921] 





  [1.828] 
0.603    
(0.138) 
[2.297] 
0.831    
(0.228) 
[2.550] 





1.039    
(0.181) 




0.826    
(0.196) 




0.440    
(0.196) 
     
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Parametric Restrictions         
Article Family FEs = 0    Included  Included   
Article FEs = 0  Included      Included 
Age FEs = 0 
   (#restrictions = 30) 
c c c c
2  1133.23 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2  718.57 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2  900.15 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2  665.92 
p-value  0.00 
Year FEs = 0
^ 
   (#restrictions = 23) 
F-stat  111.18 
p-value  0.00 
F-stat  107.72 
p-value  0.00 
F-stat  102.85 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2  171.98 
p-value  0.00 
Regression Statistics 
Log-likelihood  -11786.54  -9075.71  -8581.88  -10865.70 
# of Observations  6298  4656  3984  5997 
^  Year FEs included for 1980-2001; 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 grouped. 
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TABLE VI 
EXPLORING PERSISTENCE AND TIMING 
 
  CONDITIONAL FIXED EFFECTS NEG BINOMIAL 
 [Incidence-Rate Ratios reported in brackets] 
Non-exponentiated coefficients reported without brackets 
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors reported in parentheses) 
Dep Var = FORWARD CITATIONS 
  (6-1) 
Including a BRC-article 
Time Trend 
(6-2) 






0.256     
(0.182) 
[1.633] 





0.379    
(0.223) 
[1.649] 
0.500    
(0.288) 
BRC-ARTICLE *  
TIME TREND 
[1.045] 
0.044    
(0.013) 
 
BRC-ARTICLE *  
PRE-DEPOSIT TREND 
  [1.060] 
0.058    
(0.040) 
BRC-ARTICLE *  
POST-DEPOSIT TREND 
  [1.037] 
0.036    
(0.015) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Article FEs = 0 
   (#restrictions = 287)  Included  Included 
Age FEs = 0 
   (#restrictions = 30) 
c c c c
2    647.34 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2   782.66 
p-value  0.00 
Year FEs = 0
^ 
   (#restrictions = 23) 
c c c c
2    345.39 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2   137.89 
p-value  0.00 
Regression Statistics 
Log-likelihood  -11755.96  -11764.01 
P-value of Chi  0.00  0.00 
# of Observations  6298  6298 
 
^  Year FEs included for 1980-2001; 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 grouped. 
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 TABLE VII 
EXPLORING ACCESS COSTS & CERTIFICATION EFFECTS 
 
  CONDITIONAL FIXED EFFECTS NEG BINOMIAL  
[Incidence-Rate Ratios reported in brackets] 
Non-exponentiated coefficients reported without brackets 
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors reported in parentheses) 
Dep Var = FORWARD CITATIONS 





0.338    
(0.176) 
[1.429] 
0.357    
(0.146) 
[1.409] 





0.792    
(0.180) 
[2.170] 
0.775    
(0.158) 
[2.136] 
0.759    
(0.182) 
TIB-ARTICLE  * POST-DEPOSIT  
* PRICE˚ 
[0.996] 
-0.0038    
(0.0021) 
  [0.997] 
-0.0034    
(0.0019) 
HTB-ARTICLE * POST-DEPOSIT  
* PRICE˚ 
[0.992] 
-0.0083    
(0.0041) 
  [0.993] 
-0.0073    
(0.0042) 
TIB-ARTICLE * POST-DEPOSIT  
* NON-US 




0.163    
(0.219) 
HTB ARTICLE * POST-DEPOSIT 
* NON-US 




0.603    
(0.162) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Article FEs  Included  Included  Included 
Age FEs = 0 
   (#restrictions = 30) 
c c c c
2  916.10
 
p-value  0.01 
c c c c
2  1614.37 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2  1365.70 
p-value  0.00 
Year FEs = 0
^ 
   (#restrictions = 23) 
c c c c
2  60.43
 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2  137.48 
p-value  0.00 
c c c c
2  148.96 
p-value  0.00 
Regression Statistics 
Observations  4690  4690  4690 
Log Likelihood  -9179.36  -9188.76  -9174.07 
˚ Note:  PRICE has been demeaned in the analysis at the level of the Special Collection, so that values of PRICE reflect 
variation from the average price of all materials in its collection. 
^ Year FEs included for 1980-2001; 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 grouped. 
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FIGURE I 
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FIGURE II 
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FIGURE III-1 
AVERAGE ANNUAL CITATIONS BY AGE, 
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FIGURE IV 
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APPENDIX TABLE I 
TYPES OF BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE CENTERS 
 
Center Type  Examples 
Public / Non-Profit 
national collections 
·  ATCC (USA) 
·  DSMZ (Germany) 
·  Japan Collection of Microorganisms (Japan) 
Public / Non-Profit 
specialized collections 
·  Coriell Medical Research Institute (human genetic mutant 
cell lines) 
·  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (HIV 
materials) 
·  Ribosomal Database Project 
·  Agricultural Research Service Culture Collection (NRRL) 
Private, industrial 
collections 
·  Merck (antibiotics screening collection, clinical 
microbiology collection) 
·  Institute for Fermentation Osaka (IFO) 
Specialized University 
collections 
·  Yale University (Escherichia coli Genetic Stock Center) 
·  Ohio State (Bacillus Genetic Stock Center) 
·  Penn State (Fusarium Genetic Stock Center) 
Life Sciences Data 
Management Institutions 
·  Ribosomal Database Project (RDP) 
·  Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR 
Source:  Adapted from OECD, 2001. 
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